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I have been musing about fantasy a lot lately. Or perhaps fantasies.
One thread of my reflections has to do with fantasy in the sense of
"speaking things into being"-creative fantasy, the vision that helps cre-
ate a different reality by believing in its possibility, claiming its exis-
tence, making it so. Having a new dean will do that. So will starting
and ending a romance. Not to mention struggling to birth the next phase
of a career, and to move two children across the threshold into
adulthood.
But there's another thread also: fantasy in the sense of escape, tem-
porary or longer-term unwillingness to face reality. There's the twenty-
year-old, who admits that she's resisting growing up because she doesn't
want to face the responsibilities of adulthood, instead preferring to
immerse herself in junk novels. Or the man whose metaphor for life is
the movie Groundhog Day. Master of the seamless relationship, always
having the next woman in place before he leaves, repeating the same
pattern over and over, never facing his loneliness, his alcoholism. Or
the friend I love, but rarely connect with, as he fills the space around
him with words and busy-ness to escape the pain of the lie in the center
of his life. Or my own fantasy of reading in the warm sun on the deck
overlooking the water of East Sound on Orcas Island. So, faced with the
task of writing a paper on Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason,
how could I not talk about fantasy, escape, and speaking things into
being?
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Michael and
Pam Fischl for their generosity in organizing this symposium, opening their home to the
participants, and setting wonderful examples of both "speaking things into being" and an
understanding of reason that is not premised on a denial of emotion. Thanks also to my sisters Jan
Madill and Nancy Maranville for a lifetime of thoughtful conversation and for reading an earlier
draft of this piece, to my colleague Louis Wolcher for a careful reading and erudite comments,
and to P.M. whose struggles led me to explore the question of good and bad fantasy. And, of
course, special thanks to Pierre Schlag for his provocative and entertaining book.
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Pierre Schlag begins his book with the premise that "what unifies
the American law school ... is faith in the power of reason."' He goes
on to describe a "rule of reason"2 in which reason is "authoritative" 3 and
"entitled to rule,"4 and ends it with the suggestion that "we expect every-
thing to be done by reason."' 5 In Pierre's view this over-reliance on rea-
son is a form of enchantment, one that results in a discourse that is self-
important and intellectually stylized,6 not to mention aesthetically unat-
tractive and distracting from the (never specified) concerns of the left.
His adjectives include "not being true,"7 "pathological,"8 and "bizarre." 9
One might say that Pierre's claim that legal thinkers engage in
"magical thinking"' 10 is sufficient to discredit the enterprise, given the
apparent incompatibility of magic and reason. And yet, given the dual
connotations of both enchantment and magic, perhaps a closer look is in
order. For enchant means both "to bewitch; lay under a spell," or more
obscurely "to delude" and "to delight"; similarly, magic means both
"sorcery" and "superlatively good."'' So, perhaps our task is to decide
whether and when the "magical thinking" described by Pierre might be a
wonderful and delightful activity, and when it is simply an undesirable
attempt to bewitch us all.
In evaluating the role of "magical thinking," it may be helpful to
think about that favorite postmodern claim-the notion that reality is
socially constructed, that our understanding of the world is based on the
categories and concepts we human beings create.' 2 The process is a
dialectical one, of course, for just as we construct the world, the world in
turn constructs us. (My favorite description of this process is one that I
1. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 19 (1998) [hereinafter SCHLAG,
ENCHANTMENT].
2. Id. at 40.
3. Id. at 39.
4. Id. at 59.
5. Id. at 142.
6. See, e.g., id. at 141-42. David Carlson interprets this argument as "a romantic one. Law
should abolish itself, so that the concrete subject can act from passion, the child of integrity."
David Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910
(1999). I read Schlag not as attacking constraint, but as making a different claim. The claim is
not that the absence of rules or constraint is good, or even possible. Rather, it is that within any
cultural form, a time arrives when the form is exhausted and activity within the form has become
so routine that insufficient opportunity and space are available for creativity and growth, either
individually or culturally.
7. SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 1, at I11.
8. Id. at 117-18.
9. Id. at 131.
10. See id. at 108-09.
11. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2002), at http://dictionary.oed.com.
12. The standard cite for this proposition is PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966).
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associate with Catharine MacKinnon: an understanding of women as
weak and femininity as requiring women to wear high heels and avoid
strenuous exercise produces-surprise-women who are weak, because
they wear high heels and avoid exercise. 13)
One potential implication of understanding reality as socially con-
structed is that to a significant extent reality is something we "speak into
being." 4 We create understandings of the world, we speak them to each
other, and they become our reality. Both our cultures and our individual
lives, in other words, are, in an important sense, works of imagination,
or fantasy. 15 To some extent, life is a consensual game of make-believe.
Yet, in the dialectical process described above, the game of fantasy, like
all art, is an act of creation that results in a new reality with very tangible
real world effects. 16
If this is so, and I would argue that it is, then the claim that law
professors are engaged in consensual make-believe, which seems to be
the gist of Pierre's claim that legal thinkers engage in "magical think-
ing,""7 does not in itself invalidate the enterprise, for that will be true of
any project. The additional question that must be asked is: do we like
the selves, the lives, the worlds that are created by this particular consen-
sual game of make believe? When we create a world (or perhaps, more
properly, a subculture of law professors) whose fantasy is that reason
rules, that objective answers can be found to both fundamental and con-
crete legal questions, do we create a world that is good for us as human
beings?
Pierre is clear that the answer is "no," and I agree that we need a
better sand castle. But perhaps by exploring the roles of reason and
fantasy in our lives, we can get a few hints as we try to build a better
sand castle for ourselves. So, this paper will explore four questions,
13. While I associate it with MacKinnon, I haven't found the citation.
14. I am not articulating a radical social constructionist position that would deny the existence
of any external reality, but a more moderate position that what we perceive in that external reality
and the meaning it has for us are a function of the social world we construct.
15. The term "fantasy" is a challenging one here because of its numerous connotations, both
good and bad. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2002), at http://dictionary.oed.com.
Fantasy has many obscure meanings, including "mental apprehension of an object," and "delusive
imagination." Id. Modem definitions have a similar dual nature, including "a mental image," and
"a product of imagination, fiction, figment." Id. I will not attempt to define the term rigorously,
but instead note that I am trying to get at the double-edged nature of fantasy, its ability to create
reality, and its sometimes extreme disconnection from reality. I will explore different uses of
fantasy elsewhere.
16. For a compelling illustration, see ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU
FALL DOWN: A HMONG CHILD, HER AMERICAN DOCTORS, AND THE COLLISION OF Two CULTURES
(1997), a story of conflict between the Western medical interpretation of epilepsy and the Hmong
culture's understanding of the condition.
17. SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 1, at 108-09.
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seeking not answers, but insight What is the role of fantasy in our indi-
vidual and social lives? What distinguishes good from destructive fan-
tasy? To the extent that reason operates as a fantasy, by giving us the
illusion of control, to what extent is it a useful or a destructive fantasy?
How might legal academics build a better sand castle?
Let me explore these questions first in the context of individual
lives, before asking whether the lessons we learn as individuals have any
relevance to the social, political, or legal realms.' 8
FANTASY AND INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS
One obvious entr6e into thinking about fantasy is to consider the
role it plays in furthering individual happiness. I take this approach with
some trepidation, for I do not wish to defend the position that individual
happiness is the "be-all and end-all" of human existence, and I under-
stand that the very concept of individual happiness can be challenged
given the inextricably social nature of human existence. 19 Yet, given a
choice between more or less individual happiness, I would choose more,
in part because I am inclined to believe both that alternative goals such
as social progress and group solidarity are inextricably intertwined with
individual happiness and more likely to be furthered when individuals
are happy, rather than miserable. So let's take a fresh look at a Big
Question.
THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL GROWTH IN HAPPINESS
How are we to achieve happiness? In recent decades, this question,
central to much religious and philosophical investigation, has been elab-
orated in two related strands of research. In a burgeoning empirical
investigation into the quality of life, "the first measures tended to be
wholly economic and objective. °2 0 Later, "new concepts of subjective
18. Many on the left argue that the American tendency to psychologize problems has
powerful depoliticizing tendencies, attributing all problems to the individual and deflecting
attention away from underlying social and political arrangements. See, e.g., William H. Simon,
Fear and Loathing of Politics in the Legal Academy, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175 (2001); Homo
Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980). 1 recognize this
potential, but argue that attention must be paid to both the individual and the social/political.
Perhaps because I am a product of the women's movement for which the aphorism "the personal
is political" has been so central, or perhaps because I have the concrete thinking habits of a history
major, my intellectual work habitually begins with personal experience in some fashion. This
response to Schlag's work is consistent with that pattern.
19. My thanks to my colleague Louis Wolcher for comments that encouraged me to clarify
my position on this point.
20. See Robert E. Lane, Quality of Life and Quality of Persons: A New Role for
Government?, 22 POL. THEORY 219, 221 (1994).
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well-being... added an internal dimension."'" Recently, Amartya Sen
and others have built on the empirical research in an effort to theorize
the conditions of human development.22
In this tradition, subjective well-being (SWB) is characterized as
satisfaction, positive affect, and low levels of negative affect as judged
by individuals themselves.23 This research encompasses efforts to
develop valid and reliable measures of subjective well-being and efforts
to identify correlates of positive SWB. Despite its limitations,24 the
research arguably is consistent with the wisdom from other traditions.
Much of the empirical research identifies factors over which we
have little control, at least in the context of our own lives. These factors
include genetics, temperament, and early childhood experience. 25 Other
research provides insights more relevant to how we should live our lives.
One strand of research suggests, not surprisingly, that progress towards
individual goals is a significant contributor towards individual happi-
ness. 26 Much of this research side-steps the question whether the con-
tent of those goals matters, but other studies suggest that some goals do
in fact lead to happiness more than others. Diener et al.'s review of
recent findings suggests that happiness is furthered by goals that lead to
individual growth through increased competence, satisfying personal
relationships, and service or connection to community: 27 the relative
centrality of self-acceptance, affiliation, and community feelings were
positively associated with greater well-being, whereas the centrality of
financial success, social recognition, and physical attractiveness were




22. See, e.g., AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
23. See generally Ed Diener et al., Recent Findings on Subjective Well-Being, INDIAN J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL., available at http://www.psych.uiuc.edu/-ediener/hottopic/paperl.html.
24. See, for example, that favorite of the left, Charles Murray:
The main problem with using happiness as a self-defined construct is that it has
tended to produce reports of correlates without offering much leverage for getting
in the black box of explanation .... Happiness" is an example of a construct that
may be informed by the kinds of data that social scientists are able to obtain from
surveys, but cannot very usefully be defined by such data.
CHARLES MURRAY, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 21 (1994).
25. See Diener et al., supra note 23, at 8, 15 (finding that about fifty percent of the variation
in subjective well-being apparently stems from genetic factors, and some additional amount from
early childhood environment). "Although Tellegen et al. (1988) found that about fifty percent of
SWB can be attributed to genetics, Ryan et al. (1996) suggest that child rearing may illuminate
some of the unexplained variance." Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (addressing in detail all three of these factors).
28. Id.
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[I]ndividuals high in intimacy motives exhibited higher overall
psychological adjustment ... individuals pursuing personal strivings
related to power experienced negative emotions significantly more
frequently than those pursuing academic goals ... the degree of suc-
cess in domains related to autonomy and competence was signifi-
cantly correlated with the evaluation of how good a day was ...
needs for financial success, social recognition, and physical attrac-
tiveness were predicted by having controlling, cold, and uninvolved
parents.29
While progress towards individual goals need not imply significant
personal growth, in many cases the two will go hand-in-hand. Mihaly
Csikszentmihaly has summarized his extensive academic research on the
conditions of optimal experience, or flow, and individual satisfaction for
the popular press. 30 He argues that "following a flow experience, the
organization of the self is more complex than it had been before. It is by
becoming increasingly complex that the self might be said to grow."'"
Csikszentmihaly views growth as involving two processes: "differentia-
tion and integration. Differentiation implies a movement toward uni-
queness, toward separating oneself from others. Integration refers to its
opposite: a union with other people, with ideas and entities beyond the
self.' ' 32 Czikszentmihaly's claim that growth is critical to optimal expe-
rience is consistent with familiar psychological theories such as Mas-
low's hierarchy of needs and much parenting advice. His further claim
that "more than anything else, the quality of life depends on two factors:
how we experience work, and our relations with other people"33 seems
equally unexceptional.
Growth Through Individuation: Competence
The idea that happiness comes in part from growth through individ-
uation-the development of competence-is a familiar one.34 We have
all been children, delighting in mastering new challenges successfully or
wilting in the face of seemingly insuperable ones, and many of us have
witnessed the process in our children. Czikszentmihaly's contribution
has been to identify typical conditions for optimal experience involving
the development of competence: engaging in challenging activities that
present a good match for the individual's skill level and that provide
29. Id.
30. See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALY, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE
(1990) (citing extensively to Csikszentmihaly's academic research).
31. Id. at 41.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 164.
34. Emphasis on the "in pan." We all have incredibly competent, and incredibly miserable,
colleagues and friends.
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immediate feedback, thus allowing continued skill growth. 5 As he
notes, these conditions may be found in a wide range of activities-
reading, competitive games, physical activities-and are often created
by the participants even when the conditions are not initially present.
Growth Through Connection:
Personal Relationships, and Service or Connection
to Community
Czikszentmihaly's second path to individual growth is growth
through connection to other individuals and the community.36 The sense
that connection to other individuals is crucial to happiness finds concrete
expression all around us, despite severe pressures on the traditional
forms for that path. Participation in either a traditional nuclear or
extended family is no longer critical to economic survival in industrial-
ized nations. That fact arguably has made possible many changes in
modem life, including the development of gay and lesbian identity,37 a
significantly delayed average age of marriage, and a high rate of
divorce. Yet despite these changes, we continue to seek the personal
connection made possible by long-term romantic relationships, and, yes,
even marriage. Despite controversy within the gay and lesbian commu-
nities and vociferous opposition outside it, many gays and lesbians push
for the opportunity to marry. The newspapers and cyberspace are filled
with personal ads, many of them seeking personal connection, not sim-
ply sex of all flavors.
Traditional outlets for the need for community face similar pres-
sures.38 Participation in the union movement and in traditional political
parties has declined significantly in the United States in the last half-
century. Also on the decline is participation in civic organizations that
are less focused on the common good in a broad sense. Yet the need for
community is widely acknowledged. Many argue that service to others
is a reliable path to happiness. This is, of course, an underlying theme in
many religions and spiritual traditions, and it finds expression in the
recent popularity of service requirements for high school students.
In addition, it finds support in the form of empirical research sug-
gesting that concrete health benefits result from service and volunteer-
ing, especially efforts that involve personal contact with strangers and
using skills within a supportive organization.39 The underpinnings for
35. See CSIKSZENTMIHALY, supra note 30, at 49-58.
36. Id. at 175-91.
37. See, e.g., John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE
POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 100 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
38. See, e.g., ROBERT B. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000).
39. ALLAN LUKS & PEGGY PAYNE, THE HEALING POWER OF DOING GOOD: THE HEALTH AND
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this claim are bodies of research on the relationship between stress and
the immune system, and on the production and effects of endorphins.
The immune system research demonstrates that stress negatively impacts
the immune system and that "affiliative connections"-friendship and
other social bonds-reduce stress and improve the functioning of the
immune system.40 The endorphin research suggests that bonding and
helping behaviors may trigger the release of powerful endorphins, the
neurotransmitters that can "muffle[ ] pain" and create a "druglike
high.'
The Challenge of Creating Meaning
The challenges of individual growth take place within a larger pro-
ject of creating meaning for our lives.42 This is, of course, both an indi-
vidual and a social project. Just as individual growth involves
differentiation and integration, finding meaning involves making sense
of one's individual life and connecting it to a larger meaning, whether
located in a family or other subculture, a religious or intellectual tradi-
tion, or a political community or nation. The recent emphasis on narra-
tive in law, as well as a range of efforts aimed at humanizing legal
education and law practice, acknowledge the power of this quest for
meaning within the legal subculture.43
THE ROLE OF FANTASY IN INDIVIDUAL LIVES
How do we distinguish good fantasy from bad? On the level of the
individual, the preceding discussion suggests that good fantasy will per-
form one of three tasks: facilitate individual growth by helping the indi-
vidual develop competence in connection with intrinsic goals; further
affiliation and service by creating personal connection or connection to
the larger community; or assist with the task of creating meaning for our
lives.
By contrast, we can expect that fantasy becomes harmful when it
interferes with any of these three tasks. These insights, however, may
operate at too high a level of abstraction to provide much assistance in
SPIRITUAL BENEFITS OF HELPING OTHERS 83-87 (1992) (summarizing the medical research); see
also John Wilson & Marc Musick, The Effects of Volunteering on the Volunteer, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141-68 (1999).
40. LUKS & PAYNE, supra note 39, at 83-87.
41. Id. at 52; see also generally id. at 50-59.
42. Cf. RACHEL NAOMI REMEN, MY GRANDFATHER'S BLESSINGS: STORIES OF STRENGTH,
REFUGE, AND BELONGING 28-30 (2000).
43. See, e.g., Kim Lane Schepple, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); STEVEN
KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE (1999).
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living our lives. Thus, it may be helpful to think more about fantasy's
different uses.
Uses of Fantasy
We use fantasy in at least three distinct ways." First, we engage in
fantasy as preparation for the tasks of our daily life. We are all familiar
with the children's game of make-believe, and contemporary American
culture views childhood fantasy games as necessary preparation for
adulthood. We fantasize about the encounters we expect to have with
others, and by doing so attempt to prepare ourselves for their responses.
In the law school world, we find an institutionalized version of this use
in the role-playing exercises that comprise the entire oeuvre of moot
court programs and simulation-based lawyering skills classes, and in the
"moots" used in clinical courses to help students prepare to represent
real clients. In a more rarified milieu, Olympic athletes use fantasy in
the form of guided visualization to help turn their aspirations into
reality.
Second, we engage in fantasy as an act of creation, to bring into
being the world that we would like to exist. This is the "speaking it into
being" that I described earlier. As teachers and as parents, we know, or
learn, that in significant part we create good students and good children
by seeing their potential-hidden though it may be to themselves and to
others-challenging them, helping them develop their skills to meet the
challenges, and encouraging them to believe in themselves. My now
eighteen-year-old daughter struggled with learning issues from the time
she required speech therapy to learn to talk. Her speech therapist
observed that expressive aphasia was often accompanied by a "high
need to control her environment," a polite way of saying that she was
bossy. I still remember fondly the special education teacher who could
see the spark of potential in this bossiness and said, "I would work with
her on leadership skills. I think of a leader as someone who sees what
needs to be done and is willing to do it."
Similarly, good leaders spend much of their time building esprit, in
part by telling their people how [special, brave, brilliant, talented, all of
the above] they are. Lovers speak their undying love and all too occa-
sionally succeed in creating it. We build strong friendships by encour-
aging and complimenting our friends, supporting their dreams, helping
44. Arguably, we are engaged in a degree of fantasy simply by participating in our
(sub)cultures and attempting to make sense of our lives. The subcultures that we speak into being
continue to exist because we are willing to participate. Our lives have meaning to the extent that
we construct our narratives of purpose. Hence, I could include this paper as a use of fantasy, but I
won't.
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them feel that when we are around them they are better people.45
Finally, we can use fantasy as a way of escaping from the problems
and pain of the world around us, either temporarily or on a more ongo-
ing basis. The use of fantasy for escape encompasses a range of behav-
iors. Temporary escapist fantasy can be constructive by providing us
with a respite from the pressures of everyday life, allowing us to
recharge and return to the fray with renewed energy. Taken to extreme,
by contrast, individuals may retreat into fantasy to an extent that pre-
vents them from engaging fully with the world.
Positive Uses of Fantasy
Fantasy is both necessary and inevitable for us as individuals.
Many forms of fantasy have positive consequences for individual
growth, facilitating achievement and/or connection. Using fantasy to
prepare for real activities can have both effects, allowing us to learn
skills in a more controlled, less threatening environment before we take
on greater challenges, or giving us the confidence to reach out to other
people. Our fantasies may not always need to be "realistic" in nature to
be useful as preparation. Tantalizing psychology research suggests that
children may learn better skills for coping with real life from fantasy-
oriented television than from more realistic programming.46 (Perhaps
there's hope for law and literature teachers who claim practical benefits
for their activity.) As long as we do not remain stuck in a simulated
world, never making the transition to the next stage, preparative fantasy
has the potential to be useful.
In describing the creative, speak-it-into-being aspects of fantasy, I
noted the ways in which teachers, parents, and other leaders can build on
the spark of potential. Such positive efforts not only encourage individ-
ual growth, they can also facilitate connection by building a sense of
special obligation to the community.
Negative Uses of Fantasy
Escapist fantasy raises three barriers to individual growth and con-
nection to community. The first barrier is the risk of arrested develop-
ment and stunted growth through lack of experience. Individuals who
have experienced drug problems as adolescents typically show signs of
delayed maturity and often come across as interpersonally immature
45. In my younger years, I referred to this behavior, somewhat disparagingly, as "gushing,"
viewing it as insincere. With the wisdom of age I see it differently, and proudly recount my
successful efforts to be more openly enthusiastic and complimentary, viewing it as an important
technique for creating connection.
46. JAY HALEY, LEAVING HOME: THE THERAPY OF DISTURBED YOUNG PEOPLE (1980).
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because they missed out on many of the activities of growing up. Rather
than differentiating through complexity by taking on ever-increasing
challenges, as recommended by Czikszentmihaly, such individuals
stagnate.
A second, related risk is that the individual will use escapist fantasy
as an excuse to avoid facing interpersonal and other life problems. 7
This risk is illustrated by a common criterion for diagnosing an addic-
tion: the addiction interferes with the addict's work or family obliga-
tions. Living with even a relatively functional addict can be difficult
simply because the addict is not "present" to devote attention to working
through problems. Similarly, extreme forms of mental illness, such as
schizophrenia, can be characterized by hallucinations that result in the
individual losing all connection with the surrounding world.
The third risk is that immersion in a fantasy world will draw the
individual inward and lead to a retreat from opportunities to develop
skills or connect with other individuals and the community. Csik-
szentmihaly argues that watching television and spectator sports
"involve processing very little new information and thus require little
concentration"48 and thereby function as a type of fantasy and with-
drawal from the world.49 Marx, of course, famously characterized relig-
ion as "the opiate of the people"50 and modern critics of the mass
consumer culture argue that the incessant pursuit of "things" operates
similarly.
Though our use of fantasy for creation, to help speak worlds into
being, has the potential to further individual growth and connection, it
need not. Teachers can build on negative sparks by expecting failure or
scapegoating. Moreover, leaders, such as the Hitlers and Milosoviches
of the world, can exploit their people's fears in order to seize power and
build worlds of terror and pain.
Reason's Fantasy of Perfect Control
Security, safety, perfect control over our environment. Ah, the fan-
tasy of the cocoon, the womb, the* gated community. A powerful fan-
tasy, but an impossible, and yes, an undesirable one. Reason lures us in
part because it seems to offer us the safety and security that we antici-
pate would result from perfect control. The impossibility of perfect con-
trol, however, can be summarized in four words: nature, people,
47. See, e.g., CSIKSZENTMIHALY, supra note 30.
48. Id. at 30.
49. See id. at 162. I am translating his argument into my terms, but fairly, I believe.
50. Actually, according to JOHN BARLE-r, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 481, Item 5 (16th ed.
1982), the correct wording is: "Religion . . . is the opium of the people."
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unintended consequences. Nature's power (think volcano, flood, ava-
lanche, hurricane, and global warming), complexity (think butterfly
effect and, again, global warming), mystery, and unpredictability (think
genetic mutations) have so far stymied Mao, supercomputers, and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers. Men and women continue to
surprise and infuriate each other (divorce rate) and politicians (Osama
bin Laden and Al Gore), and the unintended consequences threaten to
overwhelm us (campaign finance reform and global warming, again).
Not only is the fantasy of perfect control impossible, it's also a bad
idea. Why? Think about the number of times that you've grown from
tragedy, disappointment, or loss. If we could control our environment
perfectly, we could eliminate many of those "I'll only go there kicking
and screaming," mandatory growth opportunities. Our likely prize for
this elimination: stagnation, not happiness.
I have suggested that perfect control is an illusion, a fantasy. Nev-
ertheless, perhaps we can still have less-than-perfect control. So let's
turn our attention to the question of when reason's offer of control func-
tions as a good fantasy, and when it functions as a destructive one.
Influence -4 Letting Go = Good, Reason -4 Control = Fantasy
The ability to reason is fundamental to an individual's ability to
function effectively in the world, and within significant Western philo-
sophical traditions rational action is viewed as an important means to
happiness."' At the most basic level the ability to engage in means-ends
reasoning-to understand that if I plant potato seeds in the spring, I will
reap an edible crop of potatoes in three months,52 or that if I leave a fire
burning in the woods during a summer drought, the resulting forest fire
may kill me-is crucial to meeting one's basic needs for food and
safety. Perhaps because our ability to engage in ends-means reasoning
is critical to continued life, we invest considerable energy in trying to
use our reasoning ability to predict events and to control our environ-
ment, both our material environment and the people around us. Indeed
many of our most significant cultural artifacts can be seen as just such
attempts: agricultural methods, astronomy, and religion.
Yet many would argue that seeking to dominate nature, to achieve
perfect control over it, is always a doomed act of hubris. One need not
be a radical environmentalist, nor a Native American traditionalist, to
recognize that the history of humanity is a record both of our successful
attempts to control our environment and our recurrent failures. Thus,
successful human functioning requires some level of modesty about our
51. See generally J.O. URMSON, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS (1988).
52. Don't take my word for it. I don't grow potatoes.
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attempts at control, recognizing that influence is more likely than con-
trol. In addition, it requires that we be able to function adequately at
those times when we face compelling evidence that we cannot control.
Psychology has, of course, grappled with the way individuals
respond to both of these challenges. Unsurprisingly, psychologists have
invested considerable time in expounding theories of developmental
psychology that address the growth in children's ability to reason, espe-
cially to reason instrumentally. 53 In addition to this focus on the devel-
opment of reasoning ability, a second major theme in developmental
psychology is the critical importance for children to develop an under-
standing that their actions can control their environment.54 At the most
basic level, if the child cries and the caretaker responds, the child learns
this crucial lesson.
Evidence suggests that in many settings we human beings function
best when we believe that the world operates according to reason and
that we have the ability to control our environment.55 An entire research
subspecialty within psychology has developed to investigate the "locus
of control of reinforcement. '' 56 The initial research suggested that indi-
viduals with an "internal locus of control"-people who believe external
reinforcement is contingent on their efforts-are most successful and
happy.5 7 Such a hypothesis seems consistent with Czikszentmihaly's
research: when we believe that the world is rational and that we can
control our environment, we are most likely to act in ways that will
allow us to control what we can. That, in turn, will often lead us to
develop our individual capabilities and relationships in a way that will
lead toward subjective happiness.
Later, more detailed investigations, however, have suggested that
an external locus of control characterized by a belief that powerful
others control reinforcements can actually be more consistent with
achievement, happiness, and willingness to initiate social change in
some circumstances. This is probably so, where the environment is in
fact one that is significantly controlled by others, a condition that, of
course, obtains for subordinated groups, such as women and racial
minorities in many cultures. 58 A plausible interpretation of this research
53. Richard Kitchener, PIAGET'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND
SCIENTIFIC REASON (1986).
54. ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1985).
55. See RESEARCH WITH THE Locus OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT, VOI. 1-3 (Herbert M. Lefcourt
ed., 1983).
56. Id.
57. See Irwin Sandier et al., Person x Environment Interaction and Locus of Control:
Laboratory, Therapy, and Classroom Studies, in 2 RESEARCH WITH THE LOCUS OF CONTROL
CONSTRUCT 187 (Herbert M. Lefcourt ed., 1983).
58. Id.
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is that people function best when their efforts are congruent with their
surroundings, i.e., they are "in touch with reality."
Many philosophical and religious traditions, academic approaches
to psychology and psychotherapy, as well as much of the popular litera-
ture emphasizing self-help and spirituality, emphasize the partial role of
reason and control. This limited role is premised variously on the
importance of feelings to human satisfaction and interaction, the role of
the irrational, the conditions of optimal experience, 59 and limits on our
ability to control other people and our environment.
Similarly, much individual and group therapy, whether facilitated
by professionals or taking place within the self-help context, struggles
with these themes of reason and control. Within the therapeutic environ-
ment, excessive reliance on reason is often viewed as an impediment to
psychological growth. Here, the suggestion that a person "lives in his
head" is not a compliment. Rather, it implies that the individual is
engaging in escapist fantasy, using intellectual activity as rationalization
to avoid feeling and moving through the pain that we inevitably experi-
ence in our lives.6°
As a result of this tension between reason's control fantasy and the
intractability of our human and physical environment, effective psycho-
logical therapy often requires grappling successfully with the limits on
our ability to control other people and events in the external world. For
this reason, step one of the ubiquitous twelve step programs spawned by
Alcoholics Anonymous is, "We admitted we were powerless over alco-
hol and our lives had become unmanageable." 61 This tension is simi-
larly reflected in those philosophical and religious traditions, such as the
stoicism of the ancient Greeks and Buddhism, that emphasize emotional
detachment. An important theme in Buddhism is that we cannot control
the world, we can only control our reaction to it.62 This is illustrated in
the Zen koan, "Before Enlightenment, chop wood, carry water. After
Enlightenment, chop wood, carry water."
63
This effort to relinquish control is often controversial, perhaps
because human beings so often see the world in "either-or" terms and
seek easy answers, resisting the notion of "both-and," the insight that
two somewhat contradictory things may be true at the same time. Thus,
59. See generally CSIKSZENTMIHALY, supra note 30.
60. See, e.g., REMEN, supra note 42, at 144-45.
61. See Alcoholics Anonymous website, at http://www.aa.org.
62. PEMA CHADRON, THE PLACES THAT SCARE You: A GUIDE TO FEARLESSNESS IN DIFFICULT
TIMES (2001); PEMA CHADRON, WHEN THINGS FALL APART: HEART ADVICE FOR DIFFICULT TIMES
(1997).
63. See J.P. TARCHER, CHOP WOOD, CARRY WATER: A GUIDE TO FINDING SPIRITUAL
FULFILLMENT IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1984).
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a willingness to give up control can easily be interpreted as promoting
quiescence in the face of injustice,6 4 rather than a willingness to trade
control for influence by opening up oneself to uncertainty and whatever
the world may bring.6" As the wording of Alcoholics Anonymous's
Serenity Prayer suggests, however, giving up control need not imply
giving up influence: "God grant me the serenity to accept the things I
cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom
to know the difference."66 Thich Nhat Han's version of engaged Bud-
dhism arguably represents a contemporary effort to find this balance
between control and influence.67
The MBTI and Differing Orientations Toward Reason and Control
In considering the positive or negative valence of reason's control
fantasy, it may also be useful to recognize that the lures of reason and
control are felt more strongly by some than by others. If personal expe-
rience does not convince you of this, consider Jung's psychological type
theory, and the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI), which is based
on Jung's theory. Jung's theory posits that individuals vary in their
characteristic orientations towards consciousness and towards the world.
The orientations towards consciousness include two kinds of judgment
("approaches toward bringing life events into harmony with the laws of
reason"): Thinking, in which judgment is based on "making logical con-
nections," "rel[ying]on principles of cause and effect," "objectivity" and
"criticality," and Feeling, in "which one comes to decisions by weighing
relative values and merits of the issues."68 In addition, Myers made
explicit two orientations to the outer world, either Perceptive, "attuned
to incoming information," "open, curious, and interested," or Judging,
64. But see, for example, the Dalai Lama. This discomfort may be related to the discomfort of
historians and lawyers with historical indeterminacy that Morton J. Horwitz alludes to in Mark
Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L.J. 131, 135-139 (2001).
65. As the mother of a now almost grown daughter who in her younger years was prone to
say, "I don't want to, I don't have to, you can't make me," one of my important life lessons
continues to be about the difference between control and influence. Short of force and terror, I
had no hope of controlling my daughter, in the sense of forcing her to do anything, but I had (and
have) considerable influence, if I can avoid the power struggles that are generated by the illusion
that control is possible.
66. According to JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES,
PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 823
(1980), the author of the Serenity Prayer, phrased somewhat differently from the version in the
text and continuing at some length, was Reinhold Niebuhr and the prayer was "[o]riginally part of
a sermon in 1943 and later used by Alcoholics Anonymous."
67. See, e.g., ROBERT HARLEN KING, THOMAS MERTON AND THICH NHAT HAN: ENGAGED
SPIRITUALITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2001). Thanks to Jan Madill for this observation.
68. ISABEL BRIGGS MYERS & MARY H. MCCAULLEY, MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR 12 (1985).
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"concerned with making decisions, seeking closure, planning operations,
or organization activities."69
Now, as it happens, there is some reason to believe that the vast
majority of lawyers70 and, one presumes, even more law professors, are
drawn towards the use of judgment by Thinking. In addition, three-
fourths of judges, 71 (and we might guess a similar proportion of Schlag's
judge-wanna-be normativos) prefer the decision-oriented judging orien-
tation to the world. It may not be too much of a leap to suggest that such
an orientation towards judging the world by thinking, especially when
accompanied by a tendency towards deciding, might incline normativos
to ask reason to do to all the work, leaving none for feelings and
values.72
The MBTI folks offer two insights that might help us evaluate the
usefulness of the fantasy suggesting that with reason we can control the
world. First, they suggest that we all use each one of the functions and
orientations measured by the MBTI test daily, 73 and that good "type
development" over a lifetime requires "striving for excellence in those
functions that hold the greatest interest and ... becoming at least passa-
ble in the other less interesting, but essential functions." What might
this mean in thinking about fantasy and reason? Well, one implication,
of course, is that we will not all have the same orientation towards rea-
son (surprise!), and that is okay. A corollary is that any given fantasy
might interfere with the individual growth of some more than others.
Nevertheless, because we are talking about law professors, who tend to
share the orientation towards Thinking, we might predict that the release
of the fantasy of reason and control will be necessary for full develop-
ment of the personality, and perhaps by extension, good understanding
of the world.
Second, they suggest that
The place to use judgment is in monitoring one's behavior and in
choosing a course of action given everything that has been perceived.
... Judgment is not best used to impose standards on others. The
terms judgmental and authoritarian describe the misplacement of
69. Id. at 14.
70. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself" A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1393 n.349 (1997).
71. At least according to the relatively small sample cited in MYERS & MCCAULLEY, supra
note 68, at 251.
72. Perhaps we could even say that: 1) when law professors feel that the The Force is strong
within them, they are feeling the enchantment of reason; and 2) some of our colleagues (surely not
us) have, as we say in my family, "control issues."
73. The MBTI evaluates four functions-thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuition-and four
orientations-extraversion, introversion, judgment, and perception. In the text I have described
only two of each.
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judgment from one's own goals to those of others.7 4
This one is pretty scary. If we are not to impose standards on others,
who will attain tenure?? Perhaps the implications are more modest.
Perhaps we readers should stop telling Schlag that it is his obligation to
propose a solution, to go normative.75 That is not what he does. Schlag
claims to be engaged in a descriptive project in the hope that a better
understanding of what we do in law will, in my words, help us "build a
better sand castle." Time will tell whether he is correct. In the end,
perhaps we should stop trying to find a solution for what "we" all should
do, in the abstract. We have different gifts, and different interests. So
choose your favorite possibility, invite some friends, and give it a try.
FANTASY, LAW, AND SOCIETY
Now comes the hard part. My discussion of fantasy and individual
happiness was, like Schlag's book, primarily oriented toward law
professors and their over-reliance on reason. Yet the world of law
professors is a small, limited one. Do these speculations on the role of
fantasy have any significance for our thinking about the effects of law
on individuals or the operation of law in the world? In Susan Silbey's
wonderful contribution to this symposium describing her study of the
stories ordinary people tell about the law, we find hints that these specu-
lations do indeed affect our thinking.76
Silbey describes three stories that people tell about the law: the
"formal rationality" of "before the law" that constitutes the "sacred face
of legality," the law "played as a game" in "with the law," and finally,
"law as a product of unequal power" in which "people often 'act against
the law' employing ruses, tricks, and subterfuges to evade or appropriate
law's power." These alternative stories suggest that ordinary people77
are only too aware of the limits of reason in the law.
One plausible reading of Silbey's study is that to the extent that
formal rationality is unable to satisfy our societal aspirations for justice
and fairness, to the extent that it is a fantasy without grounding in peo-
ple's lived experience, it is a bad fantasy. For the powerful, it is escap-
ist, allowing them to avoid addressing the injustices perpetuated by their
rule. As for the powerless, it may distract them from other solutions to
their problems. 78 Nor will the fantasy ultimately protect law's purported
74. MYERS & MCCAULLEY, supra note 68, at 67. Serenity prayer, anyone?
75. Yes, I know. I am engaging in the process of judging others. But I carefully included
myself in an admittedly lame attempt to avoid my own critique.
76. Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Double Life of Reason and Law, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 497 (2003).
77. 1 suggest that this also includes many ordinary lawyers.
78. Cf GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
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rationality, for its effectiveness will inevitably be undermined as those
subject to its power institute evasive strategies.
BUILDING A BETTER SAND CASTLE
Let me close with a few words on the problem of building a better
sand castle, or, as Jack Schlegel puts it, "But Pierre, if we can't think
normatively, what are we to do?" 79 The legal academy is not ready to
sign up en masse for Schlag's program. Even if he had a program. The
hold of reason and normativity, the desire for control, the investment in
that form of discourse, remain too powerful. Yet just as the fantasy of
perfect control appeals to some more than others, the spells of reason
and normativity do not enchant everyone equally.
THE SPELL OF REASON
A common response to Schlag's book, one that surfaced even
among participants in this symposium otherwise disposed to be sympa-
thetic, is that he is attacking reason tout court, in its entirety.8 ° This is,
not surprisingly, just a bit threatening for law professors, for we purport
to teach reasoning and our scholarship is typically based on analytical
and other forms of, yes, "reasoning." Indeed, Schlag's attack can seem
both mystifying and in rather bad faith, given that he continues to pro-
duce books and law review articles at a prodigious rate and that his work
seems to exemplify reason, understood as abstract thinking, at its best.
Yet, my sense is that this (mis?)reading of the book is more typical
among white men, and, if I am correct, might shed some light on the
gender dynamics of the conference itself.
Both Schlag's argument and his actions make much more sense if
we read The Enchantment of Reason not as an attack on reason per se,
but as a much more narrowly focused attack on SuperReason-reason
asked to perform all the work of saving the world. As Tamara Piety
argues elsewhere in this symposium, this is "Reason with a capital R,""'
reason as defined according to Descartes, in opposition to emotion. Yet,
even if we are prepared to let go of Reason's fantasy of perfect control,
this more modest attack can make sense to us only if we have available
to us compelling alternative understandings of reason.
LAW PRACTICE (1992) (discussing the ongoing debates about whether legal remedies distract
subordinated peoples from community organizing and political solutions).
79. John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What Are We to Do?,
57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955 (2003).
80. See, e.g., C.J. Summers, Distorting Reason, II YALE J. LAW & HUMAN. 529 (1999) (book
review).
81. Tamara Piety, Smoking in Bed, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827 (2003).
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In a variety of fields, from feminist theory to neuropsychology, the
Enlightenment conception of reason is under attack and alternative con-
ceptions are beginning to be sketched.8 2 Multiple strands of feminist
theory are an important part of this project. The argument that
Descartes' dichotomy between reason and emotion is wrong and seri-
ously misleading pervades much feminist theory.83 For almost two
decades, feminist standpoint theorists have developed the argument that
the questions a researcher will be motivated to ask and the information
available for answering those questions will often depend on the social
location of the researcher.84 Related and overlapping critiques of the
history of science argue that a different conception of reason is neces-
sary in order to effectuate the ideals of good science.85 Additionally,
feminist epistemologists argue for a naturalized epistemology that builds
on cognitive science.86
One example of the challenge cognitive science poses to traditional
conceptions of reason can be found in the work of Antonio Damasio, an
internationally recognized neurologist. Damasio has hypothesized on
the basis of extensive investigation of neurological disorders that the
reasoning activities of our brain are interconnected with the emotional
activities throughout the physiology of the brain. He argues that without
"somatic markers" that code experiences with emotional states, we are
unable to focus our attention, make choices, or attend to the future as we
engage in "reasoning."87 Thus, the familiar idealized vision of the
rational as detached and unemotional is fundamentally misleading.
Damasio's work has found its way into legal thought through such theo-
82. In her contribution to this symposium, Joanne Conaghan critiques Schlag, in part, for
choosing not to acknowledge these connections. Joanne Conaghan, Schlag in Wonderland, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 543 (2003). For a recent example of some of this work and an excellent
bibliography on the epistemology strand, see ENGENDERING RATIONALITIES (Nancy Tuana &
Sandra Morgen eds., 2001).
83. See Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
691 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998), for such an argument in the legal context.
84. Leading standpoint theorists include Patricia Hill Collins, Sandra Harding, Donna
Haraway, and Nancy Hartsock. A recent exchange on standpoint theory, including Harding's
relatively accessible analysis of typical misreadings of standpoint theory, can be found in 26
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SoC'Y 485-540 (2001).
85. Sandra Harding argues this point explicitly in Comment on Walby's "Against
Epistemological Chasms: The Science Question in Feminism Revisited": Can Democratic Values
and Interests Ever Play a Rationally Justifiable Role in the Evaluation of Scientific Work?, 26
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 512, 518 (2001). JANE DURAN, TOWARD A FEMINIST
EPISTEMOLOGY 73-102 (1991), contains an interesting chapter summarizing the work of Sandra
Harding, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Susan Bordo.
86. See, e.g., DURAN, supra note 85.
87. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN
(1994).
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rists as Steven Winter.88
I will not try here to elaborate further on these conceptions of rea-
son, or to defend them. For my purpose it is sufficient to note that: 1)
they are out there; 2) they are supported by considerable research and
theorizing; and 3) the widespread tendency to misread them as funda-
mentally irrationalist in nature or relativistic in import is premised on
precisely the understanding of reason that these new conceptions chal-
lenge. Though many of the thinkers leading the attack on reason are
male, my own sense is that the alternative conceptions of reason tend to
seem more compelling to women than to men.89 This seems plausible to
me for two reasons.9° First, because women in North American socie-
ties are typically permitted, encouraged, and expected to do the emo-
tional work-the care work in families and elsewhere-we pay more
attention to our emotions and more readily recognize their role in our
reasoning processes. Second, as we engage in emotional work, we often
use reason to work through our emotions, searching for intellectual
frameworks and understandings that will both help us make sense of our
emotions and, at times, trigger the feeling of the emotions. 9' In the same
societies, men are often taught that to betray emotion is unmanly. They
tend to be discouraged from showing their feelings and are thereby
inclined to repress and shy away from experiencing them. Thus, I sus-
pect a greater number of men than women would find unfamiliar and
discomforting a conception of reason that is integrated with emotions.
THE SPELL OF NORMATIVITY
Just as the spell of reason holds sway in different degrees with dif-
ferent people, the spell of normativity casts its net unevenly. I have
never qualified as one of Schlag's "normativos,"92 law professors giving
advice to judges as though they were listening. Too much proto-crit
influence in my legal training, too much feminism in my politics, too
little "Judging" tendency in my personality. So I have never felt
threatened by attacks on normativity (and I do not think that is just
88. STEVEN WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
89. One need only read Suzanna Sherry's work to recognize that this is a tendency not an
absolute. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453 (1996). On the other hand,
many men have well-developed emotional intelligence and comfort with an alternative conception
of reason.
90. Though I draw in part on personal experience here, I am also drawing on a scholarly
tradition large enough that I no longer recall specific influences.
91. Well, I do, anyway. When the task at hand is grieving, for instance, reading about typical
stages and experiences of grief is a useful trigger for doing, that is,feeling the grief. But I do not
think that I am alone. Surely these uses help explain the much greater popularity of self-help
books among women than men.
92. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
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because Schlag and I were baby law professors and carpooling buddies
together). My first law review article93 was criticized by Langdellian
colleagues for not proposing a solution to the problem I addressed, and
normativity has fared no better in my scholarship as I have aged. My
articles addressed to advocates and legal educators place me outside the
dominant discourse.
Many of the participants in this symposium have, likewise, shied
away from normativity, focusing their efforts on work of other types:
feminist or critical race theory work that is too explicitly political to fit
easily within the normative label,94 descriptive work in the best sense,95
history," empirical work.97 And though this work has not transformed
legal thought, or the legal enterprise on any large scale, I am enough of
an optimist to think98 that the seeds are being planted for a more bounte-
ous harvest eventually.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
If we want a better sand castle, we have no choice but to make use
of fantasy and speak it into being. But let us aspire to constructive fan-
tasies, not escapist ones, fantasies that are linked to an inchoate reality-
the aspirations and capabilities of both speaker and audience, the cir-
cumstances of our external world. Let us not forget that speaking (writ-
ing) things into being will not alone create a new reality. We must act.
Act, according to who we are, through our teaching, our political work,
our lawyering. We must act knowing that reason will fail us. We can
only engage with possibility, make hard choices in the absence of cer-
tainty, and learn the lessons that life presents us. Trite, perhaps, but still
true.
93. Deborah Maranville, Administrative Agency Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies,
hnperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986).
94. How many participants in this symposium can I offend by citing only a few of them here?
95. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: How TO SUCCEED
ON LAW SCHOOL EXAMS (1999).
96. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1995).
97. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
98. Read: "believe."
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